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9Executive Summary 
and Recommendations
French residents of immigrant origin, particularly those of North African and sub-
Saharan African background, have long complained that police single them out 
for unfair, discriminatory, and unnecessary identity checks. If these perceptions 
are true, it means that French police are engaged in “ethnic profiling.” That is, police 
officers are basing decisions about who may be suspicious on the basis of the color 
of their skin or their assumed ethnic identity rather than on the basis of their indi-
vidual behavior. 
In 2007, the Open Society Justice Initiative launched a study to examine whether 
and to what extent law enforcement officers stop individuals based on their appearance. 
This study was conducted in collaboration with Fabien Jobard and René Lévy, research-
ers with the National Center for Scientific Research (Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique) in France. The study was carried out under the technical supervision of 
Lamberth Consulting.
Examining five locations in and around the Gare du Nord and Châtelet-Les Halles 
rail stations, all important transit points in central Paris that are also the sites of heavy 
police activity, Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris gathered 
data on police stops carried out by National Police and Customs officers, including 
information on the ethnicity, age, gender, clothing, and bags carried by the persons 
who were stopped. This study, which generated unique information on over 500 police 
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stops, is the first to gather the quantitative data necessary to identify and detect patterns 
of ethnic profiling in France.
The study confirmed that police stops and identity checks in Paris are princi-
pally based on the appearance of the person stopped, rather than on their behavior or 
actions. Persons perceived to be ethnic minorities were disproportionately stopped by 
the police. The results show that persons perceived to be “Black” (of sub-Saharan African 
or Caribbean origin) and “Arab” (of North African or Maghrebian origin) were stopped 
at proportionally much higher rates than persons perceived to be “White” (of Western 
European origin). Across the five observations sites, Blacks were overall six times more 
likely than Whites to be stopped by police; the site-specific rates of disproportionality 
ranged from 3.3 to 11.5. Arabs were generally 7.6 times more likely than Whites to be 
stopped by the police, although again, the specific rate of disproportionality across the 
five locations ranged from 1.8 and 14.8. Follow-up interviews with the individuals who 
were stopped also suggest that these two groups regularly experience far more police 
stops than Whites.
An equally important determinant of who was stopped by police for identity checks 
was the style of clothing worn by the stopped individuals. Although people wearing 
clothing typically associated with French youth culture (including “hip-hop,” “tecktonic,” 
“punk,” and “gothic” styles) made up only 10 percent of the population available to be 
stopped by police, they made up 47 percent of those who were actually stopped. The 
study revealed a strong relationship between the ethnicity of the person stopped, the 
style of clothing they were wearing, and their propensity to be stopped by police; fully 
two-thirds of the individuals dressed in youth culture clothing were also classified as 
belonging to a minority ethnic group. It is likely that police consider both belonging to 
an ethnic minority group and wearing youth clothing to be closely tied to a propensity 
to commit crimes or infractions. 
Although persons from all ethnic backgrounds reported police behavior to be 
generally polite or neutral, those who were most targeted for police stops and identity 
checks—Blacks and Arabs—nevertheless expressed anger and frustration at what they 
believed was a pattern of police singling them out for stops and searches. 
The study used a methodology which compared the population available to be 
stopped by police (the benchmark population) with the population that is actually 
stopped by the police. Both the benchmark data and the stop data were categorized 
according to perceived ethnicity, age, gender, clothing, and the type of bag carried.  In 
observing stops, monitors also recorded the outcome of the stop and, where possible, 
conducted brief interviews with individuals who had been stopped to find out how often 
they experienced identity checks, what they thought of the officers’ behavior during the 
identity checks, and their emotional reaction to being stopped. 
Absent legitimate policing strategies that explain these stops in other than ethnic 
terms, the behavior of the French police documented in this study is highly consistent 
with ethnic profiling. In principle, ethnic profiling violates many French national non-
discrimination standards, including the police code of ethics.  It also violates European 
human rights standards which prohibit distinctions on the basis of race or ethnicity 
when these have no objective or reasonable justification.  The evidence of studies from 
other European countries and the United States suggests that ethnic profiling practices 
do not meet this threshold, as their harms significantly outweigh their benefits.
In targeting certain persons because of what they look like and not because of 
what they have done, law enforcement officers justify and perpetuate ethnic and racial 
stereotypes.  Unsatisfactory police-public contact creates a lack of trust in and unwilling-
ness to cooperate with police, decreasing their effectiveness in preventing and detecting 
crime.  The heightened police attention resulting from a reliance on stereotypes asso-
ciating persons of particular ethnic, racial or national origins with criminality can lead 
to increased conflict with the police with consequences for both the safety of the public 
and of police officers.  
The negative impact of ethnic profiling in France has reverberated in a series of 
riots that have rocked France over the past two decades, most recently in 2005 and 2007. 
It is also felt in the smaller-scale, everyday altercations between police and immigrant-
origin youth and their families; and in a broad loss of confidence in the French criminal 
justice system by the communities which are disproportionately targeted by police.  
French politicians have yet to recognize or take steps to address ethnic profiling 
by police in France.  In order to address this form of discrimination and live up to the 
true essence of the French republican ideal of the equality of all citizens, ethnic profiling 
must first be recognized as a problem, and then promptly addressed. To that end, and 
based on the evidence contained in this report, the Justice Initiative makes the follow-
ing recommendations.
To Political and Legal Authorities:
• Publicly acknowledge ethnic profiling by French police as a problem.
• Encourage and fund research to determine the magnitude of the problem in vari-
ous localities across France.
• Undertake a broad review of the legal standards, policies and practices that under-
lie patterns of ethnic profiling. 
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• Modify Article 78.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to include an explicit 
prohibition on discrimination by all police officers; to clarify and strengthen the 
grounds for reasonable suspicion that will serve as justification for police stops; 
and to clearly specify the circumstances under which searches or frisks may be 
carried out.
• Maintain and support specialized police oversight bodies like the National Com-
mission on Security Ethics (Commission Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité) 
and equip them with sufficient resources (including financial) to monitor and 
analyze complaints data for possible discriminatory practices in stop and search 
and other forms of indirect discrimination. 
• Work with local communities and associations on issues of non-discrimination to 
discuss ethnic profiling and develop policy responses grounded in consensus.
To French Law Enforcement Authorities: 
• Review the operational guidelines and procedures that regulate police stop and 
search activities to determine whether they provide adequate protections against 
discrimination and ethnic profiling, and to ensure that they conform to the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination. Provide specific guidance and training for police 
officers on ethnic profiling issues, including permissible versus impermissible 
uses of appearance in targeting identity checks.
• Require that officers explain the reason for identity check to all persons they stop, 
and provide all persons who are stopped with information on police and citizens’ 
rights and responsibilities.
• Regularly analyze stop records, and utilize the results in operational briefings 
and supervision of patrol officers as well as in the targeting of police operations 
that rely on identity checks to make sure that these powers are used in a fair and 
effective manner. 
• Make public statistical data on identity checks, stops, and searches and their out-
comes, and use this as the basis for outreach and dialogue with local residents 
to discuss the nature and reasons for any disproportionality that appears, and to 
seek alternative approaches based on agreements about local safety concerns. 
• Review, and if necessary, strengthen the supervision of patrol officers’ use of iden-
tity checks, stops, and searches on grounds of fairness and effectiveness. 
• Review all cases of rébellion or outrages (the French equivalents of “insulting an 
officer” or “resisting arrest”) to ensure that they do not reflect a pattern of repeated 
hostile encounters on the part of any individual officers or squads of the National 
Police, the National Gendarmerie, the Customs Police, and other law enforcement 
agencies. Where patterns are detected, they must be addressed through policy 
change, training, re-assignment and/or disciplinary measures as appropriate to 
the severity of the problem. 
• Introduce mechanisms to obtain feedback from citizens on the quality of police 
services such as comment boxes, surveys, qualitative monitoring by community 
groups and the like to identify both good and bad practices.
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I. Introduction 
For three weeks in November 2005, violent riots raged across 300 French cities and 
towns, at the end of which four thousand rioters were arrested, thousands of vehicles 
were destroyed, and more than 125 police officers were wounded.1 The riots were in 
part a response to the government’s callous response to the deadly electrocution of two 
young men of immigrant origin who were avoiding a police identity check.  That these 
explosive riots were precipitated by a police stop is not incidental: such stops are at the 
heart of the strained relationship between French youth and police officers, especially 
those youth of immigrant origin living in depressed urban and suburban areas. This 
population has long complained that police unfairly target them for habitual, unnec-
essary, and harassing identity checks and searches. Indeed, they see this practice as a 
manifestation of the discrimination and exclusion which they encounter on a daily basis 
when interacting with the broader French society.2
Defined as the use of ethnicity, race, national origin, or religion rather than indi-
vidual behavior as the basis for law enforcement decisions about who is believed to be 
or have been involved in criminal activity, ethnic profiling—akin to the practice known 
in France as contrôle au faciès (identity checks on the basis of physical appearance)—has 
been on the public agenda since the 1980s. Ethnic profiling can take place in a variety 
of police operations, but is most widespread in the use of powers to stop, check identity, 
and search individuals. Although civil society organizations, nondiscrimination advo-
cates and academic researchers have long reported on the prevalence of contrôle au 
faciès, this practice has never been studied in a direct or rigorous manner. Rather, 
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the information available to date is almost all anecdotal and qualitative in nature. 
As explained by one civil society advocate, “Everyone knows that racial profiling is com-
mon in France. Yet knowing it is one thing, showing it is another.”3 In significant mea-
sure this reflects French law which prohibits the gathering of ethnic statistics, as well 
as French police practice which records only a small percentage of the stops conducted 
by police.
 Profiling Minorities, the first objective and systematic study of ethnic profiling in 
France, starts to fill this empirical gap. The study was carried out from October 2007 to 
May 2008 by the Open Society Justice Initiative4 in collaboration with Fabien Jobard and 
René Lévy,5 researchers with France’s National Center for Scientific Research (Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique), and under the technical supervision of Lam-
berth Consulting.6 It employed the rigorous statistical methodology of observational 
benchmarking and monitoring to scrutinize law enforcement stops and identity checks 
carried out by National Police and Customs officers at five locations in Paris. The study 
measured the perception of ethnicity and other key variables, including age, gender, 
style of clothing, and type of bag carried, which were thought to impact police officers’ 
decision-making about whom to stop and subject to an identity check. The five sites 
under observation—three located in different sections of the Gare du Nord station and 
two located in and around the Châtelet-Les Halles commuter rail station—all repre-
sent important transit, commercial, and social hubs within Paris. They are also heavily 
policed locations, and have been the site of repeated conflict between law enforcement 
officers and the public.
The data gathered revealed that police stops and identity checks are based on 
the person’s physical appearance rather than individual actions that would lead police 
officers to determine they have committed or are about to commit a crime or infrac-
tion. The strongest determining factors of who was stopped by police were ethnicity 
and style of clothing. Persons perceived to be “Black” or “Arab” were far more likely 
than persons perceived to be “White” to be stopped by police. The same was true for 
persons dressed in clothing styles widely associated in France with youth, such as the 
“hip-hop,” “tecktonic,” and “punk” styles. Given the close association between these two 
variables—fully two thirds of the people wearing youth culture clothing were also vis-
ible ethnic minorities—clothing can be described as a racialized variable, as stops that 
were directed at certain styles of clothing resulted in disproportionate stops of ethnic 
minorities, particularly Black youth. 
Absent some legitimate policing strategy that explains these stops in other than 
ethnic terms, the behavior of the French police at these five locations is consistent with 
ethnic profiling.
This report presents the detailed results of Profiling Minorities as contextualized 
by the broader discussion of the pervasiveness, permissibility, and harmful effects of 
ethnic profiling in France. 
SECTION II provides a definition for ethnic profiling and discusses, in both general 
and specific terms, the harms it causes both to the groups it targets and to policing 
institutions themselves. 
SECTION III discusses both the modalities and the results of Profiling Minorities. It 
describes the rigorous methodology developed to observe police stops at the five observa-
tion sites. It then presents the results of the study, discussing the impact that ethnicity, 
age, style of clothing, and other variables had on the likelihood of being stopped. 
SECTION IV surveys French nondiscrimination standards and the extent to which 
these apply to law enforcement agencies; it then goes on to describe both the laws that 
govern the use of police powers to stop and search individuals in France in the con-
text of ordinary law enforcement, immigration control, and the fight against terrorism. 
This section also includes a discussion on the complex policing structure at play in the 
study’s five observation sites. Despite existing regulations which attempt to limit their 
use of these powers, French police officers still enjoy a high level of discretion when 
deciding whom to stop for an identity check and for what reasons. The study argues 
that such discretion has enabled officers to disproportionately target ethnic minorities 
for stops and searches. 
SECTION V closes the report with a summary of Paris Ethnic Study’s Profiling find-
ings of ethnic profiling, noting that the practice of ethnic profiling violates the essence 
of France’s republican ideal of equality and likely does not meet the required threshold 
for permissible difference of treatment established in European human rights law. The 
section urges representatives from government, law enforcement, and civil society to 
address the issue without delay.
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II. Ethnic Profiling in France: 
The Costs to the Public 
and the Police 
Ethnic profiling is defined as the use by law enforcement of generalizations grounded in 
ethnicity, race, religion or national origin—rather than objective evidence or individual 
behavior—as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigation decisions about 
who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.7 This definition encompasses situ-
ations where these factors are a significant, even if not an exclusive, basis for making law 
enforcement decisions.8 While ethnic profiling can be driven explicitly by discriminatory 
law enforcement policies, it is often the cumulative result of decisions made by officers 
about which to stop, search or otherwise subject to investigation. These officers may 
be unaware of the degree to which generalizations and ethnic stereotypes drive their 
subjective decision-making. Ethnic profiling remains persistent and pervasive precisely 
because it is the result of a habitual, and often subconscious, use of widely accepted 
negative stereotypes in making decisions about who appears suspicious or who is more 
prone to commit certain types of crimes.9 Ethnic profiling may also result from institu-
tional policies targeting certain types of crimes and/or specific geographic areas without 
consideration for the disproportionate impact such policies can have on particular ethnic 
groups. Policy decisions of this sort often reflect larger public and political concerns and, 
sometimes, public prejudices. 
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Ethnic profiling can be used across a range of law enforcement operations and 
tactics. The present study specifically looked at the effect of ethnicity and other fac-
tors on National Police and Customs officers’ decisions to carry out identity checks as 
defined by Article 78.2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure and relevant sections 
of the French Customs Code. National Police officers carry out these types of identity 
checks on the street or in other public places such as public transportation, and they 
target pedestrians and/or passengers10 where they have reason to suspect that they have 
committed or are attempting to commit a crime or a disturbance to public order.11 
Patrols may be either routine or large-scale operations authorized by the attorney 
general, which allow officers to conduct identity checks in a specific area for a deter-
mined period of time. 
Rather than respecting a basic precept of the rule of law—that all persons deserve 
equal treatment under the law, and that individual behavior should be the basis of legal 
liability—ethnic profiling targets certain persons because of what they look like and not 
what they have done. This definition of ethnic profiling does not mean that police and 
other law enforcement agencies can never take into account ethnicity, national origin, 
or religion in their crime-prevention or crime-detection work. They may do so where 
these factors are directly relevant to their investigations. This is most commonly the 
case when police develop “suspect descriptions,” where victims or witnesses include 
specific details about the appearances of suspects believed to be involved in particular 
criminal incidents. These factors may also be taken into account when police have spe-
cific, timely, and reliable intelligence about specific crimes or patterns of crime where 
factors such as ethnicity, national origin or religion are directly related and necessary to 
their investigation or prevention. 
Police officers are not alone in holding pejorative stereotypes about minorities and 
criminal activity; too often, such attitudes are widespread throughout society. Police offi-
cers, however, have a sworn duty to uphold the law, and when they engage in ethnic pro-
filing they not only fail that duty, but also appear to justify broader social stereotypes. 
Ethnic profiling is an ineffective and counterproductive law enforcement practice. 
It exacts a high price on the individuals, groups, and communities that are singled out 
for disproportionate attention. Police need to have legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and 
people must have confidence that the police will act fairly and effectively within the law. 
People who are habitually stopped by police—a humiliating and sometimes traumatic 
experience—often lose confidence in law enforcement agencies. British and American 
research shows that unsatisfactory police-public contacts have a negative impact on 
public confidence in the police, not only for the individual directly involved but also for 
their family, friends, and associates.12 
Ethnic profiling reduces the effectiveness of law enforcement, as policing is pro-
foundly dependent on the cooperation of the general public to report crimes, provide 
suspect descriptions, and offer witness testimony.13 Ethnic profiling can also lead to 
conflict and/or increased levels of hostility between the police and the targeted groups, 
and an increased level of hostility in encounters between individuals and law enforce-
ment agents, as evidenced in France by the multiple riots of recent years.14 Greater 
hostility increases the chances that routine encounters will escalate into aggression 
and conflict, and poses safety concerns for law enforcement officers and community 
members alike.15 
Furthermore, ethnic profiling can be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It 
is over-inclusive because the majority of people who are targeted for stops and searches 
are innocent of the suspected crime or infraction. It is under-inclusive in that there 
may be individuals who do not fit the profile and can therefore escape attention. Over-
inclusion imposes unnecessary burdens on those people who fit the profile but who are 
innocent; under-inclusion may divert police attention from individuals who are actually 
breaking the law.  
Qualitative Evidence of Ethnic Profiling in France
In France, press coverage, reports by nondiscrimination advocacy groups, and social sci-
ence research studies have documented the common perception among French youth 
of immigrant origin that they are constantly subjected to discriminatory police stops 
and identity checks. They complain that police officers treat them harshly and with 
disrespect. In the words of one young man,
  What we want is for the cops to be correct with us: ‘Hello, identity control, do you have your 
papers?’ But they go, ‘Ok, guys, you want to hassle it out? We’ll have a good time, then! Give 
me your identity card and shut your trap.’ So you give it to him, and you shut your trap. No 
hello, no goodbye, they treat us like shit.16
According to these reports, disproportionate use of stops and identity checks on 
people of immigrant origin is common in public spaces such as metro or suburban rail 
stations. As declared by a French advocacy group a decade ago, “You could stand in any 
station and observe who gets stopped and it won’t be the white, French-looking citizens. 
It will be the ethnic minorities, regardless of whether or not they have been acting 
suspiciously.”17 These assertions are supported by human rights reports and academic 
research alike. Several reports by Amnesty International found that identity checks 
tended to occur in metropolitan areas with large populations of young people of non-
European immigrant origin,18 and that these encounters often degenerated into conflict 
between the individuals stopped and the police.19 The 2005 report of the National Com-
mission on Security Ethics (Commission Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité), the 
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official body that reviews police conduct, documented over-representation of persons of 
immigrant origin, particularly young North African and African males, in complaints 
of police misconduct20—incidents which frequently arose from police identity checks.21 
Similar results emerged from an independent study of complaints of police abuse: a 
review of 50 individual cases of police abuse that took place between 2002 and 2004 
found that 60 percent of victims were immigrants and that the remaining 40 percent 
had names or physical appearance that gave the impression of immigrant origin.22 
Media reports have also touched upon discriminatory identity check operations. In 
2006, for example, journalists witnessed police on the Paris metro singling out all Asian 
passengers and removing those without identity papers. When asked for an explanation, 
the officers responded that they “already had enough blacks.”23 Human rights advocates 
suspect that police prevent many more complaints by taking preemptive action when a 
stop or identity check becomes tense or hostile: the officer or officers will file complaints 
against the civilian for outrages or rébellion, charges which are roughly equivalent to 
“insulting an officer” or “resisting arrest.” 
The frequency with which persons of immigrant origin—or those perceived to be 
of immigrant origin—are stopped by the police has been greatly influenced by France’s 
increasingly hard-line stance on undocumented migration. With the 2007 establishment 
of the Ministry on Immigration, National Identity, and Joint Development, (Ministère de 
l’Immigration, de l’Identité, et du Codéveleoppement)—the only institution of its kind 
in the European Union—the French government began setting annual targets for expul-
sions of undocumented immigrants from national territory. In 2003 and 2004, 45,500 
foreigners were charged with violating the immigration laws; in 2006 this number rose 
to 67,000, with a further increase to 70,000 in 2007 and 73,000 in 2008.24 Many of 
these individuals were also detained (35,000 held in detention in 2007 as compared 
to 28,000 in 2003). At the request of the Ministry on Immigration, French police play 
an important role in these immigration enforcement operations. At the instruction of 
the attorney general, police are tasked with carrying out identity checks for the pur-
poses of immigration control and with “making the numbers”—fulfilling the deporta-
tion quotas.25 Previously uninvolved with such operations, police forces in France have 
greatly increased the amount of resources they dedicate to immigration control; in the 
first quarter of 2008 alone, the National Police increased the time spent on immigra-
tion control by 21.7 percent over the same period in 2007.26 The political pressure on 
French law enforcement forces to combat and control undocumented migration has 
had an undeniable impact on the nature and volume of identity checks carried out by 
police officers.
The tense relationship between police and young people of immigrant origin 
in France has been further shaped by public and political law enforcement priorities. 
In recent years, the public debate on crime and safety has increasingly focused on 
“quality of life crimes,” for which “visible minorities,” particularly youth of North African 
and sub-Saharan African origin, are blamed.27 Police officers deployed in so-called “sen-
sitive urban zones” (politically correct speak for poor neighborhoods with high concen-
trations of immigrants and their descendants) are more often than not part of national 
crowd- and riot-control forces like the Republican Security Companies (Compagnies 
Republicaines de la Sécurité) and the Mobile Gendarmerie, or internal riot-control units 
such as the Police Intervention Companies (Compagnies d’Intervention Police) and 
Mobile Security Units (Unités Mobiles de Sécurités).28
The costs to police-community relationships, and consequently for police safety 
and effectiveness, have been great. Youth of North African, sub-Saharan African, Carib-
bean, and other “visible minority” origin see police as the most proximate representa-
tives of a state that targets them for repressive law enforcement control. As a result, 
police officers often become the physical target of their anger. During the 2005 riots 
in the suburbs  of Paris and other metropolitan centers more than 125 police officers 
were wounded; in 2007 close to 200 were wounded, including two officers who were 
seriously injured, and more than 80 who required hospitalization after rioters assaulted 
them with stones, gas bombs, and firecrackers.29 
When carrying out identity checks, police are often surrounded by a crowd of 
uninvolved people who watch and comment upon their actions. These interactions 
sometimes become violent, with observers throwing objects at the police. In March 
2007, serious disturbances erupted in the Gare du Nord station when a stop of a young 
Congolese man led to a violent confrontation between police and young people and 
highlighted how quickly a typical identity check can devolve into conflict.30 
French youth of immigrant origin see these actions as a way of “putting pressure” 
on the police—a means of correcting the imbalance of power between law enforcement 
officers and the people who are subject to useless and repetitive identity checks, intimi-
dation, humiliation, and even physical abuse.31 The police, on the other hand, see their 
use of identity checks and stops as a way of demonstrating their control over the public 
space, even if they have to make illegitimate use of their police powers and the legal 
authority conferred upon them by their status as law enforcement officers.32 
Although the qualitative and anecdotal evidence collected over the past decades 
has clearly pointed to the role of identity checks in creating tension between police 
and ethnic minorities, the problem has never been studied rigorously or systematically 
on the basis of quantitative data.33 These previous studies could not and did not test 
hypotheses about the differential treatment of visible minorities by the police, nor did 
they provide conclusive evidence of ethnic profiling by French law enforcement officers. 
Without quantitative ethnic data, it was extremely difficult to demonstrate the existence 
of systemic patterns of discriminatory police practices. Profiling Minorities starts to fill 
this empirical gap.
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III. Profiling Minorities in Paris: 
Disproportionate Stops of
Blacks and Arabs 
The research for Profiling Minorities was carried out utilizing a methodology based on 
observational benchmarking and monitoring where impartial monitors observed police 
stops and generated unique demographic and other data to identify possible patterns 
of ethnic profiling. Carried out from October 2007 until May 2008, the study gener-
ated unique information on 525 distinct police stops carried out by National Police and 
Customs officers in five different locations throughout central Paris. 
The study involved several elements, key among them the selection of the sample 
environment in which to collect statistically reliable and unbiased data. After observing 
police stops at 21 locations in and around Paris to determine which locations would 
be most feasible, five observation sites were selected: (1) the street-level Gare du Nord 
terminal where international and national trains arrive and depart (“GDN-Station”); (2) 
the Thalys platform at the Gare du Nord terminal, where trains arrives and depart for 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Cologne, and other European cities (“GDN-Thalys”); (3) the sub-
terranean Gare du Nord concourse for the suburban rail line (Réseau Express Régional, 
or RER) (“GDN-RER”); (4) the Châtelet-Les Halles RER station (“Châtelet-Station”); and 
(5) the Fontaine des Innocents Square, a popular outdoor plaza close to the Châtelet-Les 
Halles station and the Forum Les Halles commercial center (“Châtelet-Innocents”).34 
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The selected sites had a level of police activity sufficient to allow for the observation 
of a reasonable number of stops during the study and were also utilized by a diverse 
cross-section of Parisians. Additionally, they had previously been sites of multiple alter-
cations between French youth and the police, some of them motivated by police stops 
and identity checks.
The study hypothesized that police in Paris select which individuals to stop based 
on their physical appearance. Since the study hypothesized that those individuals who 
appeared to be “White” or of Western European ancestry would be treated differently 
than those with a non-White appearance, those under observation were classified into six 
distinct ethnic and national-origin groups: “White,” “Arab,” “Black,” “Indo-Pakistani,” 
and “Asian.” What was measured was not the actual ethnicity or national origin of the 
individuals under observation, but rather their perceived ethnicity. The study assumed 
that the monitors’ perception of ethnicity and the law enforcement officers’ perception 
of ethnicity would be very similar. Other factors that were thought to influence officers’ 
decisions about whom to stop included the age, gender, clothing style worn by the indi-
viduals, and the type of bag they carried.
Impartial monitors were trained on how to classify the individuals under observa-
tion according to these variables.To assure consistent classification, an inter-rater reli-
ability test was administered in order to assess the degree to which the observers agreed 
upon the different variable categories. In order to capture a representative sample of 
the population at each observation site, monitoring sessions were always conducted on 
specific days and times from Monday through Saturday. 
The study’s observations were of two distinct types: benchmark observations 
and stop observations. The benchmark observation was conducted in order to 
define the population at each site that was available to be stopped by the police—which 
in turn would be compared to the individuals that were actually stopped. To obtain 
a generalized data set on the available population at all five observation sites, 
monitors collected data according to the five variables on randomly selected days 
from October 2007 to February 2008, gathering data for 37,833 individuals. Overall, 
57.9 percent of those observed transiting through the five observation sites were 
classified as White, 23 percent as Black, 11.3 percent as Arab, 4.3 percent as Asian, 
and 3.1 percent as Indo-Pakistani.  
Stop observations were conducted over 75 days from November 2007 to May 
2008. The monitors observed police stops at the five locations during the same days 
of the week and time periods that the benchmarking observations were conducted, 
recording a total number of 525 stops. Of the recorded stops that were attributed to a 
specific location, 130 were observed at GDN-RER, 72 at Châtelet-Station, 119 at GDN-
Thalys, 119 at GDN-Station, and 82 at Chatelet-Innocents.  Of the 524 individuals who 
were stopped for whom it was possible to assign an ethnicity, 141 were classified as 
White, 201 as Black, 102 as Arab, 36 as Indo-Pakistani, 21 as Asian, and 23 as “other 
ethnic group.” 
An additional variable was recorded during the stop observation phase: the post-
stop outcome. This variable measured whether the individual was stopped and ques-
tioned, stopped and frisked, stopped and searched, or stopped and detained. Following 
the recording of the stop data, the observers also conducted qualitative interviews with 
the persons who were stopped by the police. The interview questions addressed the 
general frequency with which the individuals were stopped, the behavior of the police 
during the stops, and the individuals’ feelings about the stops.
An expanded discussion of this methodology is presented the Appendix. 
The Results
Police Stops and Ethnicity: The Disproportionate Targeting of Blacks and Arabs 
The behavior of French police at the five observation sites was highly consistent with 
ethnic profiling. Blacks and Arabs were far more likely than Whites to be stopped by 
the police. (The data for Indo-Pakistanis and Asians are not analyzed here because the 
number of stops that would be expected on the basis of the benchmarks of these two 
groups is too small to support statistical analysis of any significance. At all five locations, 
only 36 stops of Indo-Pakistanis and 21 stops of Asians were recorded.)
The best way to understand whether ethnic profiling is occurring is through a 
statistic called the “odds-ratio.” The odds-ratio quantifies the probability that members 
of a particular ethnic group are more likely to be stopped by police as compared to other 
ethnic groups.38 The odds-ratios presented in the report compare the Black and Arab 
population to the White population. Thus, the statistic can best be understood by filling 
in the ratio in the following sentence, “If you are Black (or Arab), you are x times more 
likely to be stopped by the police than if you were White.” The odds-ratio has been widely 
accepted as the best statistical representation of ethnic profiling because, more than other 
possible presentations of the same data, it is the quickest and easiest way to compare and 
understand the different experiences of policing by people of different ethnic origin.
If no ethnic profiling occurs, the odds-ratio would be 1.0, indicating that non-
Whites are no more likely to be stopped than Whites. Odds-ratios between 1.0 and 
1.5 are considered benign; those between 1.5 and 2.0 indicate that a review of the stop 
and search practice should be undertaken to determine if an ethnic bias exists. Ratios 
above 2.0 indicate that there is potential targeting of ethnic minorities for police stops. 
These values are generally associated with statistical significance in situations where 
the number of stops at each location is small (generally 100 or fewer), a situation that 
is fairly common with deployed analyses. 
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Table 1 shows that when compared to Whites, Blacks are consistently stopped at 
much higher rates at all five of the locations studied.  Overall, Blacks are six times more 
likely to be stopped as Whites. At Châtelet-Station, Blacks are 11 times more likely to 
be stopped than Whites. At GDN-Station, they are six times more likely than Whites to 
be stopped.  At GDN-Thalys, Châtelet-Innocents, and GDN-RER they are respectively 
5.58, 3.93, and 3.32 times more likely than Whites to be stopped. The data are clear that 
Blacks are ethnically profiled.
TABLE 1 : 
Odds-Ratios for Blacks v. Whites by Location




 (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
GDN-Station 5,654 82.2% 22 40.7% 1,224 17.8% 32 59.3% 6.7
GDN-RER 3,630 57.1% 26 28.6% 2,724 42.9% 65 71.4% 3.3
GDN-Thalys 3,218 92.5% 63 69.2% 260 7.5% 28 30.8% 5.58
Châtelet -
Station
4,906 65.1% 6 14.0% 2,628 34.9% 37 86.0% 11.5
Châtelet-
Innocents 
4,215 70.8% 24 38.1% 1,742 29.2% 39 61.9% 3.9
Arabs are also more likely to be stopped than Whites. Overall, Arabs are 7.8 times 
more likely than Whites to be stopped. This general indication of disproportionality, 
higher than the comparison between Blacks and Whites, reflects the great amount of 
variation in the Arabs versus Whites odds-ratios. At GDN-Station, Arabs are 13 times 
more likely than Whites to be stopped, and at Châtelet-Station they are almost 15 times 
as likely as Whites to be stopped. The odds-ratios at GDN-Thalys and Châtelet-Inno-
cents, while still indicating significant disproportionality in police stops of Arabs, are 
lower. At GDN-RER, where Arabs are only 1.8 times more likely to be stopped than 
Whites, the odds-ratio indicates that ethnic profiling may be going on, but is not con-
clusive to that fact.39
TABLE 2 :
Odds-Ratios for Arabs v. Whites Only by Location




 (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
GDN-Station 5,654 89.0% 22 37.9% 696 11.0% 36 62.1% 13.24
GDN-RER 3,630 74.3% 26 61.9% 1,253 25.7% 16 38.1% 1.8
GDN-Thalys 3,218 96.8% 63 84.0% 106 3.2% 12 16.0% 5.8
Châtelet -
Station
4,906 82.4% 6 24.0% 1,048 17.6% 19 76.0% 14.8
Châtelet-
Innocents
4,215 79.3% 24 55.8% 1,098 20.7% 19 44.2% 3.0
Police Stops and Age: The Targeting of Young People 
The data indicate that young people—those classified as persons who are not middle-
aged or older—are disproportionally targeted by the police, as they were overstopped 
at all five observation sites. Interestingly, there was significant variability of odds-ratios 
across the different sites. For example, young people at Châtelet-Station were only two 
times as likely to be stopped as older people, whereas at Châtelet-Innocents, where they 
constituted 53.3 percent of the total available population but were stopped 98.8 percent 
of the time, they were 72 times as likely to be stopped. At GDN-RER and GDN-Station, 
young people were, respectively, 7.9 and 3.6 times as likely as middle-aged and older 
people to be stopped. 
These results are not surprising. Global crime data indicates that young people 
are the most active population involved in criminal activities, particularly inter-personal 
violence, theft, and consumption of illicit drugs.40 Furthermore, all five locations have 
been the site of multiple, often violent, altercations between young people and police 
officers, a pattern that would lead us to expect a higher degree of police attention on 
this population.
Equally consistent with findings in other countries, males were overwhelmingly 
among those who were stopped. The odds-ratios for males ranged from 9.88 at Chatelet 
Station, to 3.50 at Châtelet-Innocents, to 8.83 at GDN-Train, to 1.62 at GDN-Thalys, to 
9.35 at GDN-RER.41
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Police Stops and Clothing: The Disproportionate Stops of Individuals Wearing 
Youth Clothing
People wearing “youth clothing”—different clothing styles typically associated with 
young French persons such as “hip-hop,” “goth,” and “tecktonic”—were also targeted 
by the police. See Table 3 for a detailed description of the youth clothing category. 
TABLE 3 :
Youth Clothing Descriptions
Hip-Hop • Large, distinctive sneakers or tennis shoes
• Baggy pants 
• Extra-large t-shirts
• Hooded sweatshirts
• Baseball cap worn backwards or to the side
Gothic42 • Heavy, exaggerated make-up
• Head-to-toe black attire
• Clunky shoes 
• Use of accessories such as facial piercings, handcuffs, and nails
Punk43 • Spiky hairstyles (e.g. Mohawks)
• Heavy use of black leather clothing
• Use of accessories such as facial piercings, handcuffs, and nails
Tecktonic44 • Heavy use of eye make-up
• Tight and bright t-shirts
• Slim-cut jeans with distinctive belts
The benchmark data show that while overall, 10 percent of the available popula-
tion at all five locations were wearing youth clothing, they constituted 47 percent of all 
the persons that were stopped. People dressed in youth clothing were overall 11.4 times 
more likely to be stopped than those wearing business or casual clothing,45 although 
there were important variations between the locations. At Châtelet-Innocents, where 
people dressed in youth clothing constituted 16.4 percent of the population available 
to be stopped but constituted 73.5 percent of the population that was actually stopped, 
they were 14 times more likely to be stopped than either those in business or casual 
clothing. The odds-ratio was even higher at Châtelet-Station, where people dressed in 
youth clothing were 16 times more likely to be stopped than people dressed in other 
styles of clothing. At GDN-Station, however, they were only five times more likely to be 
stopped. 
P R O F I L I N G  M I N O R I T I E S :  A  S T U D Y  O F  S T O P - A N D - S E A R C H  P R A C T I C E S  I N  P A R I S    3 1
TABLE 4 : 
Stops by Clothing and Location 













GDN-Station 16.4% 0.8% 0.44 77.6% 72.7% 0.77 5.9% 26.4% 5.72
GDN-RER 10.0% 0.8% 0.07 75.5% 37.5% 0.19 14.5% 61.7% 9.50
GDN-Thalys 31.6% 6.6% 0.15 66.1% 71.9% 1.31 2.3% 21.5% 11.63
Châtelet-
Station 
10.0% 1.5% 0.14 80.1% 34.3% 0.13 10.0% 64.2% 16.14
Châtelet-
Innocents
6.6% 0.0% 0.00 76.9% 25.3% 0.10 16.4% 73.5% 14.14
It is important to note the high degree of correlation between the youth clothing 
category and the minority ethnicity classifications. In other words, people wearing youth 
clothing were overstopped, as were Blacks and Arabs. 
The data raise questions about the relative strength of these variables: which is the 
strongest predictor for being stopped by police—wearing youth clothing or belonging 
to a non-White ethnic group? The aggregate numbers comparing Whites to all other 
minority ethnic groups (including Indo-Pakistanis and Asians), show that ethnicity mat-
ters more: Non-White persons are 3.5 times more likely to be stopped than White per-
sons, while persons wearing youth clothing are 2.9 times more likely to be stopped than 
people wearing other clothing (business or casual). When the data are disaggregated, 
however, and Whites are compared only to Blacks or only to Arabs, wearing youth cloth-
ing appears as the stronger predictor for police stops, although not by a significant mar-
gin. The change in these variables’ relative strength is greatly affected by the inclusion 
and exclusion of stops of the two smaller ethnic categories (Indo-Pakistani and Asian). 
In reality, the predictive strength of these two variables is approximately equiva-
lent. It is probable that the police consider both belonging to an ethnic minority and 
wearing youth clothing to be closely tied to a propensity to commit crimes. 
Yet even if the clothing style is the key variable at work in police decision-mak-
ing, this has a disproportionate impact on ethnic minorities since a larger percentage 
of this population wears youth clothing. Fully two-thirds of the individuals dressed in 
youth clothing were also classified as belonging to one of the non-White minority ethnic 
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groups. In the benchmark data, only 5.7 of the Whites wore youth clothing, whereas 19 
percent of Blacks and 12.8 percent of Arabs wore youth clothing. Youth clothing may 
thus be described as a racialized variable. Even if police are targeting their identity con-
trols on the type of clothing individuals are wearing, the end result is a disproportionate 
number of stops of ethnic minorities, particularly Blacks. 
People in business attire were grossly under-stopped at all five locations. Individu-
als in casual clothing were under-stopped everywhere but at GDN-Thalys. This is prob-
ably not surprising as many business people ride the Thalys trains.
Police Stops and Bags: An Unexpected Result
Contrary to the original research hypothesis, persons carrying no bags were overstopped 
at all locations except for GDN-Thalys. Since all the sites except for Châtelet-Innocents 
are characterized as sensitive areas under France’s counter-terrorism policy, and there-
fore subject to special scrutiny under the VIGIPIRATE program (see page 46), the expec-
tation was that police officers would be likely to target people carrying bags of the sort 
that could accommodate explosives or other harmful weapons. As shown in Table 5, 
this was not the case. 
TABLE 5 : 
Odds-Ratios for Bags by Location
Location Large Bags Other Bags No Bags
GDN-Station 0.84 0.19 4.01
GDN-RER 0.55 0.20 11.1
GDN-Thalys 1.35 0.60 1.71
Châtelet-Station 0.30 0.18 9.19
Châtelet–Innocents 0.69 0.20 5.30
The lower odd-ratios at GDN-Thalys for those carrying no bags are perhaps due 
to the particular nature of that location. Passengers on Thalys trains are traveling to or 
returning from European cities (including Brussels, Amsterdam, and Cologne), often 
overnight, and would therefore be expected to carry larger bags. Given that one of the 
main tasks of the Customs officers that patrol the platform is to search bags for con-
traband materials, it is therefore likely that individuals carrying large bags would be 
stopped by them. This may explain the odds-ratio for large bags at GDN-Thalys: 1.35, 
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constituting a modest over-stopping of those individuals. On the other hand, traveling 
on an international train with no bags at all can be construed as suspicious, and thus 
lead to the over-stopping of persons with no bags at GDN-Thalys, even if in lower dispro-
portion than at the other locations. It is important to note, however, that the odds-ratios 
for ethnic minorities and for those wearing youth clothing are higher than those for 
people carrying large bags or no bags at GDN-Thalys. This may indicate that Customs 
officers are more interested in the physical appearance of the persons that they stop 
rather than whether they are carrying a particular type of bag or no bag at all. 
Post-Stop Outcomes: Questions on the Effectiveness of Stops 
Of the 525 stops observed, 169 were classified as an “ordinary stop”—one where the 
police merely spoke to the individual for a short while, checked their identity docu-
ments, and let them go. Thirty-five stops progressed to frisking, 209 involved a search 
of the person and/or his or her property, and 73 ended with the person being taken into 
police custody. Thirty-nine post-stop outcomes were classified as “unknown.”
TABLE 6 :
Post-Stop Outcome by Ethnicity at All Five Locations 
Ethnicity Ordinary Stop Stop & Frisk Stop &  Search Stop & Detain Total
White 57 (43.8%) 4 (3.1%) 60 (46.2%) 9 (6.9%) 130 
Black 43 (23.6%) 18 (9.9%) 85 (46.7%) 36 (19.8%) 182
Arab 30 (30.9%) 12 (12.4%) 42 (43.3%) 13 (13.4%) 97 
Indo-Pakistani 22 (61.1%) 1 (2.8%) 9 (25%) 4 (11.1%) 36 
Asian 10 (50%) 0 (0%) 6 (30%) 4 (20%) 20 
It is important to note that being taken into police custody does not mean that 
the person was necessarily arrested or charged with an offense. In some percentage of 
cases, possibly many of them, people were simply taken to the police station to verify 
their identity and were then released (see the discussion on page 43 of the legal and 
operational difference between a simple identity check [contrôle d’identité] and a more 
rigorous verification of identity [verification d’identité]). For this reason, the observational 
methodology used in this study cannot determine the “hit rate”—the rate at which police 
stops produce concrete legal outcomes such as fines, citations, arrests, and charges—for 
the stops that were observed. Nevertheless, the fact that almost a third of the stops were 
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“ordinary stops” that did not involve further police activity and that fully 78 percent of 
the persons stopped were let go without any apparent need for police detention raises 
questions about the effectiveness of these practices.  
The data indicate Blacks and Whites are searched at almost identical rates, while 
Arabs are searched slightly less often. Blacks are searched 46.7 percent of the time that 
they are stopped, Whites 46.2 percent, and Arabs 43.3 percent. The differences in treat-
ment appear at the level of who is frisked and who is taken into police custody. Blacks 
and Arabs are respectively four and three times more likely than Whites to be frisked, 
and they are respectively three to two times more likely to be detained by police than 
are Whites.46 
When looking at this data, it is important to note that the disproportionality 
in police treatment among Blacks, Arabs, and Whites appears to occur at the moment 
the decision is made to stop someone rather than in what happens to that person 
after the stop. The relatively small number of stops in each post-stop outcome 
category and the variation across the five locations means that the differences in post-
stop outcome among Blacks, Arabs, and Whites do not reach statistical significance. 
The data gathered in the study are therefore inconclusive as to whether police are 
being more punitive toward ethnic minorities after they have been stopped. Further 
research is necessary to confirm whether the similarities and differences among 
the different ethnic groups in post-stop outcomes hold true when studying a larger 
number of cases.  
There was also great variation of post-stop outcome across the different locations. 
For example, stops and searches were very common at GDN-Thalys: 67 out of the 121 
stops observed there ended with a search. Such a high rate of searches is to be expected 
given the duties and functions of the Customs officers that patrol that platform. Stops 
and searches were also very common at Châtelet-Station, where 30 out of the 68 stops 
observed for which a post-stop outcome was recorded ended with a search. One pos-
sible explanation for the high prevalence of stops and searches at Châtelet-Station is 
that, unlike the other locations, this observation site did not have a police station on the 
premises, forcing police to carry out these more invasive inspections in full view of the 
public rather than in a private area. 
In general, there was significant variation in the prevalence of stops across the 
five locations. Seventy-one percent of all stops observed took place at GDN-Station, 
GDN-RER, and GDN-Thalys, begging the question of why so few stops were observed 
at Châtelet-Station and Châtelet-Innocents. Does this lower rate of stops at the last two 
locations indicate a difference in local policing priorities? What factors could be influ-
encing the higher rate of stops at the Gare du Nord locations? It is beyond the scope 
of this study to answer these questions, which require discussions with the police and 
further research. 
When considering the “post-stop outcome” variable, it is also interesting to note 
the relative effects of the ethnicity and clothing variables. The data gathered strongly 
indicate that ethnic minorities wearing youth clothing are more likely to face more 
intrusive police intervention once they are stopped.  Sixty Whites wearing youth cloth-
ing were stopped by the police; of these, 27 experienced ordinary stops while 33 experi-
enced more serious interventions such as searching, frisking, and/or detention. In other 
words, for every White person that experienced an ordinary stop, one White person went 
on to be frisked, searched or detained. For Blacks and Arabs wearing “youth-clothing,” 
however, there is a 1:4 ratio: for every Black or Arab wearing youth-clothing that was 
simply stopped by the police and let go, four went on to be frisked, searched or detained. 
Only 22 Blacks wearing youth clothing experienced ordinary stops, while 92 went on to 
be frisked, searched or detained. Only seven Arabs wearing youth clothing experienced 
an “ordinary stop,” whereas 33 of them went on to be frisked, searched or detained. 
Interview Answers Support Finding of Ethnic Profiling
The monitors attempted to interview all those persons whom they observed being 
stopped. Interviews with stopped individuals took place concurrently with stop obser-
vations, and were conducted at all five observation sites. A total of 173 people were 
interviewed, but as some people were interviewed in groups, the total number of inter-
views (147) is lower. 
When asked whether this was the first time they had been stopped, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents (82 percent) answered in the negative; only 23 percent of all 
interviewees reported never being stopped. In answer to the follow-up question of 
how many times they had been stopped in the past month, respondents gave both 
general and specific answers. Thirty-nine percent of the interviewees reported being 
stopped “often”; 25 percent reported being stopped between two and four times per 
month; and 16 percent reported being stopped more than five times per month. It 
should be noted that the range in the number of stops in this last category was large, 
with people reporting being stopped from five to nine times in the past month to as 
much as 20 times. 
Ethnic minorities reported higher levels of stops. Thirty-one percent of Black 
respondents reported being stopped between two and four times per month, and 18 
percent reported being stopped more than five times per month. Every single individual 
reporting a rate of stops greater than nine in the last month was Black. Twenty-three per-
cent of Arab respondents reported being stopped “often,” with an additional 53 percent 
saying they were stopped more than twice a month. Of the Whites that were stopped 
and interviewed, 56 percent reported being stopped often, 15 percent reported being 
stopped two to four times per month, and 13 percent reported being stopped more than 
five times per month. 
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TABLE 7 :
How do you feel after this stop?
A selection of answers from Blacks and Arabs
“It’s very dispiriting.”
“There’s no justice; it’s always the same people being stopped: the Blacks and the Arabs.”
“There’s injustice and discrimination; the repercussions will be felt in the suburbs.” 
“They stop me because of my looks; I feel like slapping them.”
“It’s fine; they’re just doing their job.”
“They’re bastards.”
“It’s disgusting; people are stopped because of how they look..”
“For cops, there is a criminal under every baseball cap. I understand that they are doing their job, 
but most of the criminals are wearing suits. There was more dialogue when we had community 
police.”
“They’re just doing their job.”
“It’s racism, plain and simple.”
“It’s fine—It’s the police’s job to stop people.”
“I think I was stopped because I don’t ‘look right.’” 
“I don’t mind the stops—they happen all the time.”
In response to the question about the officers’ treatment of them during the stop, 
only 3 percent of respondents reported racist or insulting treatment by the police; the 
vast majority—76 percent—were neutral as to police behavior during the stop. Six per-
cent indicated that the police acted in a respectful, polite manner. In their own words: 
“They were nice, even funny” (“Ils ont été gentils, voir marrants.”); “They treated me with 
respect,” (“Ils lui ont traité avec respect.”); “They were composed and polite” (“Ils étaient 
posés et polis.”). 
Despite the generally neutral or positive review of police behavior, these encoun-
ters generated strong negative feelings. Although some people said that the police were 
just doing their job and thus they were not bothered by the encounter, almost half the 
respondents reported being annoyed or very upset about the stop. Those people who 
reported being stopped multiple times a month displayed a mix of resignation and 
anger. Many respondents reported feeling targeted because of the way they looked, with 
a few explicitly noting that it was Black and Arabs who were always stopped. A fair num-
ber spoke to the interviewers about their rage, their shame, and their lack of confidence 
in the French police. The damage that stop practices can do to the police’s relationship 
with the public is clear. 
Based on respondents’ answers, the police did not provide any reason for the stop 
more than 60 percent of the time. When officers did provide a justification, the reason 
was linked to an easily observable infraction—fare dodging, cigarette-smoking, or public 
drinking—or was described as a “routine” stop.
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IV. The Law and Practice of 
Police Stops in France
The conclusion of Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris that 
the French police are disproportionately targeting Blacks and Arabs for stops and iden-
tity checks in the five observation sites begs the question: Why is this happening? What 
underlies the apparently disproportionate focus on these ethnic minorities? What could 
justify such discrimination in police use of identity controls? 
Before examining French police powers to conduct stops and searches for the 
purpose of crime detection, immigration control, and the prevention of terrorism, the 
section reviews French nondiscrimination standards and the manner in which these 
apply to policing practices.  As described below, extensive nondiscrimination standards 
have limited application as regards policing and the use of identity checks. In these 
matters, the critical standards are set out by the French codes for criminal procedure, 
immigration, and customs. The legal grounds for identity checks established in these 
codes grant French police officers wide discretion in stopping and searching individuals. 
This discretion, combined with limited recording of stops and no monitoring of possible 
ethnic bias, creates the opportunity for these powers to be used in a disproportionate 
and discriminatory manner. 
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French Nondiscrimination Standards 
The principle of equality is enshrined in the very first article of the French Constitution, 
which guarantees that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social 
Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction 
of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.”47 
As a member of the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), France is 
also bound by the general nondiscrimination treaties and laws such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights and various discrimination-related EU directives. The 
most important among these is Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin (commonly known as the EU Race Directive), which establishes the principle of 
equal treatment in the case of either direct or indirect discrimination based on racial 
or ethnic origin.48 The scope of application of the Race Directive includes employment, 
social protection mechanisms, social advantages, education, and “access to supply of 
goods and services which are available to the public.”49 The common understanding 
among European law experts is that the EU Race Directive applies only to those goods 
and services encompassed by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which excludes domestic law 
enforcement. This interpretation has yet to be challenged in European courts.50
The EU Race Directive was transposed into French law in November 200151 and 
amended existing French nondiscrimination standards in both civil and administra-
tive law (primarily in the Labor Code) as well as in criminal law.52 The key provisions 
modified the scope of grounds for discrimination; introduced the concept of indirect 
discrimination (in civil law only); and introduced the reversal of the burden of proof in 
discrimination cases. As amended by the 2001 law, discrimination is defined by Article 
225-1 of the French Penal Code as follows:
  Discrimination comprises any distinction applied between natural persons by reason of their ori-
gin, sex, family situation, physical appearance or patronymic, state of health, handicap, genetic 
characteristics, sexual morals or orientation, age, political opinions, union activities, or their mem-
bership or non-membership, true or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion.
  Discrimination also comprises any distinction applied between legal persons by reason of the 
origin, sex, family situation, physical appearance or patronymic, state of health, handicap, 
genetic characteristics, sexual morals or orientation, age, political opinions, union activities, 
membership or non-membership, true or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or 
religion of one or more members of these legal persons.53
Article 225-2 of the Penal Code sets out the scope of application of this provision in 
criminal law;54 but as of yet these provisions have not been applied to policing practices.55 
In addition to these legal provisions, the French National Police are bound by the 
National Police Code of Conduct (Code de déontologie de la Police Nationale) which 
prohibits discrimination and describes polite and respectful treatment.56 It applies to the 
National Police only (including those who exercise immigration and counter-terrorism 
functions), not the Gendarmerie Nationale or the customs authorities. Municipal police 
forces have their own, nearly identical code.57 These codes of ethics do not specify race 
or ethnic origin as specifically prohibited grounds for discrimination. 
 Article 7 of the National Police Code of Conduct mandates that:
  …in the service of the public, police officials are to behave towards the public in an exemplary 
manner. They are to demonstrate an absolute respect of all persons, whatever their nationality 
or their origin, their social situation, or their political, religious or philosophical beliefs.58 
According to Article 6 of this code, “[ f ]ailure to meet the obligations set out in this 
Code can result in disciplinary sanctions for officers, without prejudice, where relevant, 
to penal law sanctions.” Internal circulars remind law enforcement officers of their 
nondiscrimination obligations, but these do not provide specific and practical guidance 
on proper conduct when conducting identity checks and searches.
Complaints against police officers by a member of the public—which may be 
made directly to the police or to the National Commission on Police Ethics (Commis-
sion Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité)—give rise to an administrative inquiry. 
Judicial proceedings may follow the inquiry in the case that the officer is determined to 
have committed a prosecutable offense. Evidence suggests that these procedures have 
not proven adequate to prevent discriminatory actions by French police.59
Legal challenges to the discriminatory impact of French police’s stop-and-search 
practices are complicated by several other factors. Given the legal obligation to comply 
with identity checks created by Article 78.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see 
discussion below), it is difficult for persons targeted by identity checks to challenge the 
legality of the stop at the moment it is taking place. To do so would be construed as 
an obstruction of justice under French law, and could submit the individual to further 
police action. Thus, the identity check can only be contested after the fact. 
Furthermore, the prioritization of immigration control, prevention of terrorism, 
and the prosecution of petty infractions have placed a performance burden on police 
officers that can be at odds with respect for nondiscrimination standards. Thus an envi-
ronment is created where ethnic profiling practices can develop and flourish, especially 
as there is no apparent attempt to monitor the use of stops in terms of either their 
effectiveness in preventing or detecting crime, or in terms of their fairness or their 
potential disproportionate effect. 
The critical locus of guidance on police powers in contacts with members of the 
public is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly in its provisions on 
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powers to conduct identity checks and searches. These are discussed in detail in the 
following sections, along with further powers under the legal framework regulating 
immigration policies and customs control. 
Police Powers to Conduct Stops, Identity Checks, 
and Searches 
In France, police powers to conduct identity checks are regulated by four principal legal 
frameworks: the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners 
and of the Right to Asylum (Code de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers et du Droit 
d’Asile), and the Customs Code (Code des Douanes). In certain cases, provisions of the 
national VIGIPIRATE counter-terrorism plan can also apply. Although national jurispru-
dence has attempted to limit the way in which these powers are utilized, law enforce-
ment officers still enjoy a wide margin of discretion in deciding whom to stop, when to 
stop them, and for what reasons they can be stopped. 
Stop and Search in the Context of Ordinary Law Enforcement 
Police stops and identity checks in France serve both an investigative and a preventive 
function: investigative when they are directed at persons who have committed or are 
suspected of having committed a crime, and preventive when they are used to secure 
a particular geographic perimeter when there is a threat to public order or to personal 
security. Both kinds of stops are regulated by Chapter 3 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, titled “Identity Inspections and Identity Checks.”60 
According to Article 78-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Any person in the 
country must agree to submit to an identity check carried out under the conditions and 
by the police authorities” set out by law. Article 78-2 of the same code establishes that 
police officers can ask any person to justify his or her identity by any available means 
when one or more plausible reasons exist to suspect that: (1) the person has commit-
ted or has attempted to commit an offense; (2) the person is preparing to commit an 
offense; (3) the person is able to provide information useful for an inquiry into an 
offense; or (4) the person is the subject of a judicial investigation. Stops under the first, 
third and fourth headings are considered “judicial” stops, whereas stops under the sec-
ond heading are considered “administrative” stops.61 
Under this same article of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a district attorney 
(procureur de la République) can order police officers to carry out stops and identity 
checks in specific places during predetermined times to combat and detect particular 
offenses.62 When such orders are in place, police can stop any person without needing 
to provide justification. Police officers are also authorized to conduct identity checks 
in all areas open to international traffic, including rail stations, airports, seaports, and 
highway tolls and other locations specifically designated by ministerial decree, without 
needing to meet a suspicion threshold.63 Additionally, police may carry out identity 
checks when they believe there to be a risk to public order or safety of other persons 
and property, regardless of the behavior of the individual stopped and irrespective of 
whether the individual stopped is breaking any laws. This power is often invoked dur-
ing large gatherings or in large public places, and has been used to justify the powers 
of inspection and search which police officers have in areas covered by VIGIPIRATE, the 
French government’s antiterrorism plan (see below).64
Police identity checks in France operate on an incremental, escalated scale of 
action. At one end of the spectrum, is the identity report (relevé d’identité) in which police 
officers stop a person and ask him or her to account for their presence in a particular 
location through a few simple questions. This type of stop is mainly carried out by 
municipal police officers or auxiliary police agents who do not have full police powers in 
response to lower order offenses such as noise disturbances and public health violations. 
The targeted individual can legally refuse to answer the police officer. 
The most common type of identity control, carried out by officers from the 
National Police—who patrol all urban areas in France and are solely responsible for 
policing Paris—is the identity check (contrôle d’identité). By law, all French citizens are 
required to comply with this type of check and must provide police officers with identity 
documents. If the individual stopped is unable to present proper identity documents 
or if the police officer has reason to doubt their legitimacy, an identity check (contrôle 
d’identité) can become a verification of identity (vérification d’identité). As defined in 
Article 78-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a vérification d’identité implies a brief 
detention in police custody while officers confirms an individual’s identity; this is the 
most coercive form of identity control in France. 
Identity controls can sometimes proceed to frisks and/or searches of an individ-
ual’s person and property. Frisks are considered a measure to ensure a law enforce-
ment officer’s security, and searches are seen as an investigative tool akin to a search 
warrant. Although existing legislation does not specifically regulate the use of frisks 
and searches, French jurisprudence has established that these two measures should be 
used under separate circumstances. Frisks are allowed when carrying out an identity 
check, but searches presuppose that the person is in possession of objects (or has traces 
or indications of objects) that would give the officer grounds to believe that he or she 
has participated in a crime. Frisks often lead to searches—since frisks can lead to the 
discovery of objects such as knives whose possession is likely to result in an infraction. 
In reality, a frisk provides the grounds for a search, and thus in practice, if not in law, 
it goes beyond a mere security measure. 
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Operationally, police officers are granted wide discretion in the utilization of iden-
tity checks. When interviewed a few months after the March 2007 disturbances in the 
Gare du Nord station, the second-in-command police officer explained that the main 
targets for police are young gang members who loiter at the station. In order to prevent 
a similar altercation, the police have begun to collect information on “who the juveniles 
loitering here really are” by systematically carrying out identity checks and noting who 
was where, when, and with whom. This reconnaissance enabled the police to determine 
that they were dealing with an amorphous, leaderless group of youths who had no sense 
of belonging to any particular territory.65 
French courts have tackled the question of just what kinds of appearances or 
behaviors are relevant and acceptable to police stops and identity checks of people 
believed to be acting in a “suspicious” or “abnormal” manner indicative of preparing 
to commit a crime or offense. Their rulings have identified several behaviors such as 
changing direction after spotting police officers and hiding from or attempting to flee 
police officers. Other, sometimes similar behaviors have not been upheld by courts, 
leading a French legal expert to conclude that “the understanding of the grounds is a 
delicate matter and the test of their validity sometimes hard to establish.”66 A recent 
police training manual provides the following examples of behavior that would provide 
legal grounds for a stop or identity control: running away from the police; repeatedly 
walking by a jewelry store window late at night, walking around in an inebriated state; 
and hiding one’s bag from the police.67 Nevertheless, the jurisprudence on this issue 
remains unclear and sometimes contradictory. 
Stop and Search for the Purposes of Immigration Control 
The persons most exposed to stops, identity controls, and searches in France are foreign-
ers (and those presumed to be foreigners) as they are subject to both the identity control 
provisions regulated by the Article 78.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to those 
provided in the French Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum. 
Article L611-1 of the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and of the Right to 
Asylum, in effect since 1945, requires all foreigners in France to carry with them at 
all times proof of their legal stay or right to transit through the country. Under this 
regulation, French police can subject foreigners to identity checks at any time without 
having to meet the suspicion criteria established in Article 78.2 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Furthermore, under this same article a public prosecutor can ask police to 
target the infraction of undocumented migration by conducting identity checks in a 
geographical area known for its population of foreign-origin residents.68 
Police must base their identity checks for immigration control purposes on 
objective criteria that make it reasonable to assume that the individual stopped is 
a foreigner.69 Several decisions by the French Constitutional Council have set out a 
limited number of broad principles limiting police use of stop and search powers for the 
purposes of immigration control. A 1993 ruling by the French Constitutional Council 
stipulated that under no circumstances can immigration stops be motivated by any 
discriminatory indicators.70 A related decision ruled that police officers must always 
base their stops on the particular circumstances surrounding the individual.71 According 
to a 1985 ruling by the Cassation Court, the “presumption of foreignness” must be based 
on objective factors inferred from circumstances external to the individual himself or 
herself—meaning that police cannot rely on physical appearance to determine who may 
or may not be a foreigner.72 The few rulings by lower courts as to the definition and 
scope of such “objective factors,” however, have sent law enforcement officers mixed 
signals as to what factors they can take into account when carrying out immigration 
stops and searches. In 1992, the Cassation Court ruled that the act of speaking in a 
foreign language does not justify an immigration identity check.73 However, a first 
instance criminal court in Versailles postulated that appearance, behavior, dress, or even 
diction could be considered objective indications of foreign origin.74 One court found 
that it was legitimate for police to stop the people participating in a demonstration by 
undocumented migrants as their presence at the rally indicated a greater likelihood of 
their being foreign, but prohibited the exclusive singling out of all dark-skinned people.75 
Other courts found that activities such as reading a foreign-language newspaper or 
book, driving or riding in a car with foreign license plates, and/or playing “folk” 
instruments in a public space could be considered objective indications of foreign 
origin.76 Thus, the existing case law offers police officers at best ambiguous guidance as 
to what factors constitute legitimate grounds for supposing that a person is a foreigner, 
and fails to establish comprehensive limits on police stops for the purposes of 
immigration control. 
Stop and Search as a Counter-Terrorism Tactic
The stop and search powers granted by Article 78-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
also apply to counter-terrorism operations. In 2001, however, French police were granted 
specific stop and search powers related to the fight against terrorism through the new 
Law on Everyday Security (Loi de Sécurité Quotidienne)77 which amended the Code of 
Criminal Procedure to allow police officers the power to conduct stops and searches of 
both vehicles and individuals for the purposes of detecting terrorist acts without needing 
to meet a suspicion threshold.78 A formal request by the district attorney that details the 
actions under surveillance as well as the geographic location and duration of the stop 
and search operations may be issued, but is not an absolute requirement. Subsequent 
modifications to the Code of Criminal Procedure also extended the limits of the border 
zone in which police are allowed to carry out terrorism-related stops on international 
trains traveling through France. 
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VIGIPIRATE is the French government’s principal counter-terrorism plan, created 
in 1978 by administrative order and updated a number of times since then. Among its 
other functions, VIGIPIRATE establishes a graduated four-level alert in response to the 
threat of terrorism, with specific public security measures implemented at each level. 
The alert level is determined by the prime minister on the basis of intelligence informa-
tion, with level-specific measures implemented by different law enforcement agencies 
working in collaboration with local authorities and other relevant bodies. The general 
public is not privy to the intelligence information that determines any shift in the terror 
alert level. Since the July 2005 bombings on the London Underground, VIGIPIRATE has 
been maintained at alert level three (“Red”). 
Under the plan, areas open to the public can be classified as “sensitive zones,” 
which establishes—de facto if not de jure—a presumption of risk to public order that 
justifies police stop-and-search operations. The permanent enforcement of the VIGIPI-
RATE plan has granted law enforcement officers the right to stop, carry out identity 
checks, and search the belongings of persons in large public spaces such as airports 
and train stations without having to adhere to any suspicion standard. Four of the five 
observation sites of the present study (all but Châtelet-Innocents) have been classified 
as sensitive VIGIPIRATE zones where police can stop and search individuals at will. 
The legal status of VIGIPIRATE is less clear. A 1998 Cassation Court judgment 
ruled that invoking the VIGIPIRATE plan does not classify as an automatic threat to public 
order as specified in Article 78-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that identity 
controls should not be carried out under this pretext.79 It is unclear whether this ruling 
has had any effect on the use of these expanded counter-terrorism powers. 
Police and Security Structure in Paris 
In France, public security is entrusted to two law enforcement agencies, both of which 
fall under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. The National Gendarmerie is 
responsible for policing rural areas, while the National Police force is responsible for pro-
tecting urban areas, including Paris.80 The structure of both forces is highly centralized. 
The National Police is regulated by the General National Police Directorate (Direction 
Générale de la Police Nationale), which itself is divided into multiple sub-directorates 
such as the Central Directorate for the Judicial Police, the Central Directorate for Public 
Security, and the Central Directorate for Border Police. The Customs officers fall under 
the authority of the Ministry of Budget, Public Accounts, and Civil Service. 
Municipal police forces also operate in many French cities, but they generally 
enjoy limited powers, particularly in the area of stop and search (as explained above, 
they may only carry out the relevé d’identité). There is no municipal police force in Paris, 
as the city operates under a unique policing structure wherein all public security forces 
operating there, including the National Police, fall under the command of the Paris 
Police Prefecture. The Paris Police Prefect is answerable to the Minister of the Inte-
rior but enjoys significant autonomy in setting the Parisian region’s policing priorities, 
including the allocation of human and other resources. 
The Paris Police Prefecture also has the power to request from the central gov-
ernment additional security forces to provide surveillance at large public events. For 
example, it can request reinforcements from the National Gendarmerie or specialized 
squads of the National Police, such as the anti-riot Republican Security Companies 
(Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité) and the Mobile Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie 
Mobile). It also has the power to assign police agents to operations initiated by the dis-
trict prosecutor, such as the search for a particular suspect in a specific crime. 
Four of the five observation sites included in Profiling Minorities are located in 
railway zones and/or train and metro stations. All security operations in these sites fall 
under the command of the Paris Police Prefecture, including those of private security 
agents. Within the National Police there is a specialized force—the Regional Service of 
Transport Police (Service Regional de Police des Transports)—charged with securing 
the 1300 trains of the metro, suburban, and national rail lines throughout Paris and its 
environs. This division, which includes 1300 agents divided up into 160 different police 
squads, carries out targeted surveillance missions several times a month.
Moreover, the four observation sites that have been designated as sensitive VIGIPI-
RATE are also patrolled by army soldiers. The soldiers exercise no police powers, and are 
not authorized to carry out identity checks. Their presence is meant only to serve as a 
deterrent to terrorist activities. The Gare du Nord has also been named as a “Schengen” 
area by ministerial decrees, allowing police officers to carry out identity checks as estab-
lished by Article 78-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Customs officers patrol the GDN-Thalys platform under the authority granted to 
them by Article 67 of the Customs Code.81  Customs officers can levy duties on imported 
goods, combat the trafficking of illicit substances, and regulate the entry and exit of for-
eigners. In order to fulfill these duties, they are authorized to carry out identity checks 
and searches without condition.
 Additional security forces are provided by the different metro, suburban, and 
national rail companies operating within Paris. Although private, these security forces 
still fall under the authority of the Paris Police Prefecture, and sometimes engage in 
collaborative operations with the National Police. Their powers to do so are severely 
limited, however. For example, agents of the Group for Network Protection and Security 
(Groupe de Protection et de Sécurisation des Réseaux), retained by the Autonomous 
Authority for Parisian Transportation (Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens), the 
agency in charge of all metro and suburban transport in Paris and Île-de-France), have 
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been deputized by the Police Prefecture and can intervene in violations of transporta-
tion regulations, in self-defense, or in cases of flagrante violations of the law. They can 
give tickets and remand individuals into police custody, but they cannot conduct identity 
controls. On the other hand, security officers hired by the National Society for French 
Railways (Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français), also deputized by the Paris 
Police Prefecture, have been able to carry out identity controls since 2001, but can only 
do so in the case of violations of transit laws. The study’s observation sites are also 
patrolled by multiple private security companies hired by surrounding businesses. They 
play no public security role whatsoever, and cannot carry out identity checks.
French intelligence efforts are organized by the Central Directorate of Internal 
Intelligence (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur), which in turn is manned 
by National Police officers who have been assigned to these specialized duties. These 
officers do not have special stop and search powers, and must operate under the guid-
ance of the relevant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure.82 Their actions did not 
form part of this study. 
The policing structure in Paris is complex. For the average person traveling 
through any of the five observation sites of this study, it can be quite difficult to dis-
tinguish between the different public and private security forces patrolling the area. 
Many wear very similar uniforms and sometimes engage in joint patrols and operations, 
making it difficult to distinguish who is conducting the stops and identity checks and 
whether they have the competency to do so.
V. Conclusion
In establishing that Blacks and Arabs, particularly those dressed in youth clothing, are 
disproportionately targeted for identity checks at all five observation sites, particularly 
those who are dressed in youth clothing, Profiling Minorities provides the first quantita-
tive evidence that police in France are engaging in ethnic profiling. Based on a rigorous 
methodology that found statistically significant differences in the treatment of ethnic 
minorities, the study marks an important first step in addressing this discriminatory 
practice. 
Contrary  to a basic precept of the rule of law—that all persons deserve equal treat-
ment and that individual behavior should be the basis of legal liability—police appear 
to be targeting individuals for stops based on what they look like rather than what they 
do. The permissive legal framework that regulates the use of stop and search powers 
facilitates such discriminatory practices by granting police officers broad discretion to 
use these powers without establishing firm parameters for suspicion, especially in the 
areas of immigration control and counter-terrorism operations.
When confronted with such data, many police institutions are likely to justify such 
disproportionate treatment by invoking crime rates and apparently different patterns of 
offending among particular ethnic groups. In countries such as the United States, where 
criminal justice data can be disaggregated by ethnicity, this has been used to demon-
strate apparent differences in crime rates between Whites and ethnic minority groups.83 
Similar comparisons can be made in France between French citizens and foreign 
nationals, rather than among different ethnic groups.84 Indeed, much research exists to 
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suggest that police in France, like law enforcement forces in many other countries, have 
developed suspect profiles in which ethnic characteristics play an important role.85 This 
argument—that the disproportionate impact of police practices such as stop and search 
is a justified response to ethnically disproportionate involvement in crime—is deeply 
flawed for several reasons.
It has been well documented that police detect only a fraction of the crimes that 
are committed.86 Additionally, crime detection rates vary across different social groups, 
as evidenced by the comparisons between victimization surveys and police crime 
statistics.87 The number of criminals identified by police is not a representative sample 
relative to the universe of offenders. Moreover, existing studies indicate that the dispro-
portionate targeting of minority ethnic groups for stops and searches is more a reflec-
tion of stereotypes than it is a reflection of real offending rates. One way to measure the 
success of a stop is by its “hit rate”—the rate at which a stop leads to the detection of 
an actual crime. There is evidence that when police base their stops on racial or ethnic 
stereotypes rather than on individual behavior, their hit rate suffers.88 In several munici-
palities in Spain and Hungary, where police have been trained to conduct their stops on 
the basis of behavioral indicators rather than an assumed link between ethnicity and 
certain types of crime, police forces have seen their hit rate go up at the same time as 
the total number of stops have decreased.89 
In all probability, French police engaging in ethnic profiling in the study’s observa-
tions sites are in violation of European human rights norms established under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and by the European Union. The jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights has established that when ethnicity constitutes 
an exclusive or decisive basis for law enforcement action, it almost certainly constitutes 
discrimination under the convention.90 Differential treatment violates the principle of 
equality when it is “devoid of objective and reasonable justification, the existence of this 
justification must be assessed in relation to the purpose and effects of the measure.”91
It is difficult to imagine that the disproportionate treatment of Blacks and Arabs 
identified in this study would meet the “objective and reasonable justification” standards 
set by the European Court of Human Rights.92
France stands at a crossroads. The country has already experienced the negative 
impact of the discriminatory use of these law enforcement powers—in the violent 
uprisings of November 2005 and November 2007, in the smaller-scale everyday 
altercations between police and immigrant-origin youth, and in the general loss of 
confidence in the French criminal justice system by those communities and towns that 
are disproportionately impacted by these operations. In the absence of any policy change 
to address this environment, the situation in France will remain tense and may continue 
to deteriorate. 
At the same time, there are hopeful indications that the country is ready to face the 
issue of police discrimination head-on. The issue of ethnic profiling has become a hot 
topic of discussion in the French media. In December 2008, the president appointed a 
commissioner on diversity and equal opportunities whose work is being followed with 
much interest by policymakers, civil society advocates, and the media alike. The National 
Police has recently partnered with the national equality body, the High Authority against 
Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et 
pour l’Égalité) to provide officers with training on how to identify and document dis-
crimination claims and reports of hate crimes. Some police unions are also collaborating 
with civil society organizations to provide “know-your-rights booklets” and information 
on ethnic profiling. A spirited discussion also continues in policy and academic circles 
about the collection of official ethnic statistics. In short, the moment is ripe for the issue 
of ethnic profiling to be taken seriously by policymakers, law enforcement agencies, 
and civil society actors. The existence and nature of the problem must be recognised 
frankly and openly by political and police authorities. This recognition and awareness 
will provide the first steps toward developing the policies and practices that end ethnic 
profiling in France. 
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Appendix: The Methodology 
behind Profiling Minorities: 
A Study of Stop-and-Search 
Practices in Paris
The observational research methodology utilized for Profiling Minorities was pioneered 
in the United States by Dr. John Lamberth, who, together with the Justice Initiative and 
Dr. René Lévy and Dr. Fabien Jobard, policing experts with the National Center for Scien-
tific Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) adapted the methodology to 
the French context and implemented the study in Paris. Preparatory steps including the 
selection of observation sites and the training of observers, was completed by Autumn 
2007. The field research was conducted in the five Paris locations from October 2007 
to May 2008.
The study involved several key elements: selection of locations at which to conduct 
the observational monitoring; selection and definition of the variables to be studied; 
training of objective monitors; benchmarking of the available population in the selected 
sites according to the specified variables; and observation and recording of police stops 
according to the same variables. This approach generated an exact benchmark of the 
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population present in specific places at specific times, including demographic informa-
tion on their perceived ethnicity and other factors. It also generated a unique description 
of hundreds of police stops, including information on the ethnicity and other key traits 
of the individuals stopped. In addition to these quantitative elements, the monitors 
conducted interviews with the persons stopped to obtain further qualitative information 
on the nature of the encounter and past experiences of being stopped. 
Selection of Observation Sites
In selecting the observation sites for the present study, it was important to choose pub-
lic spaces where the level of police activity would be sufficient to allow the monitors to 
observe a reasonable number of stops during the observation period. This selection is 
called a deployed analysis, different from a random selection of observation sites.93 It 
was equally important to select sites that would be utilized by a diverse cross-section 
of Parisians. The five selected observation sites fulfilled these requirements. They also 
provided an environment in which monitors could consistently observe the actions of 
the police in an unobtrusive manner, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the study. Fur-
thermore, most of the sites were located within the Paris public transport system—a 
public space long reported to be a key site of ethnic profiling. 
After observing police stops at 21 locations in and around Paris to determine 
which locations would be most feasible,94 five observation locations were chosen: 
• the street-level Gare du Nord terminal where international and regional French 
trains arrive and depart (“GDN-Station”);
• the Thalys platform of the Gare du Nord terminal, where trains arrive and depart 
for Amsterdam, Brussels, Cologne, and other European cities (“GDN-Thalys”);
• the subterranean Gare du Nord concourse for the suburban RER (Réseau Express 
Régional) rail network (“GDN-RER”); 
• the Châtelet-Les Halles RER station (“Châtelet-Station”);
• the Fontaine des Innocents square, a popular outdoor plaza close to the Châtelet-
Les Halles station and the Forum Les Halles commercial center (“Châtelet-
Innocents”).
Of all the potential observation sites surveyed, these five were the only ones where 
the study’s designers observed a sufficient level of police activity that would make the 
study feasible. Furthermore, the five observation sites are some of Paris’ principle trans-
P R O F I L I N G  M I N O R I T I E S :  A  S T U D Y  O F  S T O P - A N D - S E A R C H  P R A C T I C E S  I N  P A R I S    5 5
portation and social gathering hubs. More than 180 million people transit through the 
Gare du Nord complex each year; it is the biggest train station in France (one of the 
largest in Europe in terms of passenger traffic) and serves dozens of metro, suburban, 
regional, and international trains. The Châtelet-Les Halles Station is also a major stop 
for several metro, RER, and regional train lines; approximately 13 million people pass 
through it every year.95 These train stations are two of the few public spaces easily acces-
sible to and shared by Parisian residents of all backgrounds. This is also true of Joachim 
du Bellay Place (site of the Fontain des Innocents), located a few meters outside the 
main entrance to the Châtelet-Les Halles Station. All three of these locations have also 
been sites of multiple altercations between young French people and the police, some 
of them motivated by police stops and identity checks.
The Thalys platform at the Gare du Nord was selected for a different reason. 
The Thalys is an international train service with routes to Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. The Thalys platform is patrolled by Customs officers, rather than National 
Police officers. The study selected this site with an interest in observing any similarities 
or differences in the behavior of this different law enforcement body. 
Monitoring Schedule
Monitoring sessions were conducted at specific times to capture a representative sample 
of the population at each observation site. From Monday through Saturday, GDN-Sta-
tion, GDN-RER and Châtelet-Station were observed during three four-hour sessions: 
8:00 to 12:00, 12:00 to 16:00, and 16:00 to 20:00. Because Thalys trains arrive and 
leave most frequently in the morning and in the late afternoon and early evening, week-
day monitoring sessions at GDN-Thalys took place from 8:00 to 12:00 and 16:00 to 
20:00 only.96 Since people gather at Châtelet-Innocents primarily in the late afternoons 
and evenings, observations at that location took place from 16:00 to 21:00 on Mondays 
through Thursdays, 16:00 to 22:00 on Fridays, and 16:00 to 23:00 on Saturdays. No 
observations were scheduled on Sundays for any of the locations. 
Selection of Observation Variables 
In order to identify possible stop and identity check patterns and to highlight factors 
that might be influencing officers’ decisions about whom to stop, the study observed 
individuals and classified them into different categories. The study hypothesized that 
police officers in Paris select individuals to stop based on their physical appearance. 
Ethnic profiling occurs when, rather than basing their decision to stop someone on 
operational briefings, suspect descriptions or flagrant law-breaking, police select people 
to stop based on how they perceive that person’s ethnicity and on their own associations 
about ethnicity and the likelihood of those persons committing offenses. Thus, what was 
being measured was not the actual ethnicity of the persons under observation, but rather 
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their perceived ethnicity. The study assumed that the observers’ perception of ethnicity 
and the police officers’ perception of ethnicity would be very similar. 
The study hypothesized that those individuals who appeared “White”—or of 
Western European ancestry would be treated differently than those with non-White 
appearance. Both the benchmark population (the population of people available to be 
stopped by the police) and the population of persons who were actually stopped were 
classified into six distinct ethnic/national origin groups as listed in Table A1. 
TABLE A1 :
Ethnic/National Origin Categories
“White” Persons perceived to be of Western European origin
“Arab” Persons perceived to be of North African or Maghrebian origin
“Black” Persons perceived to of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin
“Indo-Pakistani” Persons perceived to be of Pakistani or Indian origin
“Asian” Persons perceived to be of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or 
Vietnamese origin
The study’s designers considered including an additional category for Roma 
people. However, the Roma population appeared to be too low at the five observation 
sites to warrant inclusion in the study. The categories of Indo-Pakistani and Asian were 
included because they were a known “visible minority” population in the Gare du Nord 
and Châtelet-Les Halles areas. Additionally, media and other reports had indicated that 
they were a target of police stops, particularly for the purposes of immigration control. 
The designers of Profiling Minorities posited that police stops could also be influ-
enced by factors other than ethnicity. To test this hypothesis, data were gathered for four 





• Middle-aged and 
older
Pilot observations had indicated that a 
preponderance of those stopped by police were 
young. Since the visual determination of exact 




Pilot observations indicated that most of those 
who were stopped by police were male. To confirm 






Type of clothing appeared to be an important 
determinant of who was stopped. The “youth 
culture” category encompassed hip hop, punk, 
gothic, ragamuffin, new-wave, tecktonic, and other 
styles popularly associated with young people. 
“Casual” clothing indicated normal every-day 
attire, distinct from the more formal “Business/
Well-dressed” style. 
Bags • Large bag
• No bag
• Other 
It was hypothesized that the carrying of large bags 
capable of carrying explosives or other contraband, 
particularly those that could be used in a terrorist 
attack, could impact a police officer’s decision 
of whom to stop. Thus, monitors collected 
benchmarking and stop data on the size of the bag 
carried by individuals. 
Training Monitors
Monitors were trained over a two-day period. The training consisted of a short descrip-
tion of the project; an explanation of the places where the monitoring would be con-
ducted; explicit explanations of the data to be collected; instructions on how to record 
the data; and field work practice to assure that the monitors were comfortable in making 
their observations. 
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To assure that the monitors would consistently and correctly classify all the people 
they observed according to the variables, an inter-rater reliability test was administered 
to each potential monitor. Six sets of photos of individuals representing the different 
classification categories (two for ethnicity and one each for age, gender, clothing, and 
bags)97 were flashed on a computer screen at five-second intervals. The potential monitor 
was required to classify the ethnicity of the person in each picture. After all the monitors 
were tested, the “correct” answers were determined based on the consensus answers of 
the monitors’ responses. The monitors selected all scored higher than 90 percent on 
the inter-rater reliability test. 
In order to ensure that monitors would be able to record the measurement of 
variables as unobtrusively as possible, the study’s designers developed a system whereby 
mobile phones could be used to record the data. This way, they were able to gather 
information without using paper, pencil or other recording instruments that would 
draw attention. 
Benchmarking
Disproportionate stops of certain ethnic groups can only be rigorously established by 
comparing the ethnicity of the individuals who are stopped against a benchmark that 
determines the proportion of those same ethnic groups in the population that is avail-
able to be stopped by the police. The demographic of the available population in a deter-
mined location is generated through an “observational benchmark.”98 To develop this 
benchmark, observers monitor the selected sites on randomly-selected days to obtain a 
sufficient data set to generalize an available population for these locations. The ethnic 
composition of the population at these locations is then compared to the ethnicity of the 
individuals who are stopped at the same places. To ensure the accuracy of this compari-
son, a large benchmark is preferable—at least over 1000 at each location. Benchmarking 
observation took place from October 2007 to February 2008.99 
To assure accurate ethnic identification, individuals included in the benchmark 
must be selected at random. As the observers could not possibly collect data on every 
person they saw, they collected information on the first person they saw from their 
observation point, waited three seconds, recorded information on the next person they 
saw, and so on. The fixed observation points were carefully selected to allow the moni-
tors an unobstructed view of a steady stream of individuals.
Of the 37,833 individuals observed during the benchmarking phase, 99.5 per-
cent of them were successfully categorized. Overall, 57.9 percent of those individuals 
observed were White, 23 percent were Black, 11.3 percent were Arab, 4.3 percent were 
Asian, and 3.1 percent were Indo-Pakistani. Less than 1 percent were classified as “Other” 
or “Unknown”.100 This benchmark data on ethnicity should only be taken as an indicator 
of the ethnic make-up of the population transiting through the five observation sites, 
and not as an indication of the overall population of Paris and its surrounding areas.
Table A3 shows the ethnicity percentages for each of the five locations.
TABLE A3 :
Ethnicity Percentages per Location101
Location White Black Arab Indo-Pakistani Asian
GDN-Station 71.7% 15.1% 8.3% 1.8% 2.8%
GDN-RER 42.2% 33.6% 15.2% 6.4% 3.6%
GDN-Thalys 86.5% 7.0% 2.8% 0.7% 3.0%
Châtelet -Station 51.4% 27.5% 12.2% 3.8% 5.0%
Châtelet-Innocents 54.5% 23.9% 14.2% 1.6% 5.7%
Monitoring Stops
Following the benchmarking, the monitors returned to the same locations during the 
same time periods to observe police stops. Stop observation took place on a total of 75 
days from November 2007 until May 2008.102 Monitors recorded data only on stops car-
ried out by National Police officers and, for the GDN-Thalys location, Customs officers. 
Stops by metro or rail security guards or private security guards were not recorded. 
Monitors worked in teams of two.103 One monitor was responsible for observing 
the stop and recording the established variables. The second monitor was responsible 
for interviewing, where possible, the individuals whom the team had observed being 
stopped in order to obtain qualitative data (see discussion below).
During the stop observation phase, one additional variable was recorded: the post-
stop outcome.104 This variable was divided into four categories:
• Stop & Question: The police merely stopped the individual and posed some 
questions. 
• Stop & Frisk: The police stopped the individual and patted down or frisked the 
individual. 
• Stop & Search: The police stopped the individual and conducted a search of their 
bag or pockets.
• Stop & Detain: The police stopped the individual and took him or her into police 
custody. 
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Between November 2007 and May 2008, data was collected on 525 stops. Of these 
stops, 501 were of the five benchmarked ethnicities: 141 Whites, 201 Blacks, 102 Arabs, 
26 “Indo-Pakistani,” and 21 “Asian.” Twenty-three of the stops were of “Other” ethnic 
groups, and only one stop was classified as “Unknown.” 
Based on preliminary stop observations carried out during a pilot phase, the 
research team expected monitors to observe approximately two stops per hour. In real-
ity, the monitors observed about 1.25 stops per hour. These stops did not occur equally at 
the five locations. Eighty-two stops were observed at Châtelet-Innocents, 72 at Châtelet-
Station, 119 at GDN-Thalys, 119 at GDN-Station, and 130 at GDN-RER. On three stops 
data for location was incomplete.
Interviews
Following the observation and recording of a stop, the second monitor followed the 
stopped individual (assuming he or she was not detained) until they were both out of 
sight of the police. Once the interviewee had consented to the interview, the monitor 
asked a series of questions pertaining to their perception of their encounter with the 
police. The questions asked went to the general frequency with which the individuals 
were stopped, the behavior of the police during the stops, and the individuals’ feelings 




Is this the first time you have been stopped? 
[If “no” to previous question] How many times have you been stopped in the past month? 
Where were you last stopped? 
Question 2 
Were the police polite during the stop you just experienced? 
How was your experience of that stop?
Question 3
Did the police give you a reason for the stop? 
 [If “yes” to previous question] What reason did police give you for the stop? 
Question 4
How do you feel after this police stop? 
The interviews were completely anonymous—no personal data of the interviewee 
was requested or recorded. To avoid drawing undue public attention, the interviewees’ 
answers were not directly recorded during interviews, but called into a central voicemail 
service immediately following the interview and later transcribed.
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to intervene in a flagrant délit case and when to refer such cases for further prosecution. René Levy, 
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Klincksieck, 1987). 
 A 2009 study conducted by Fabien Jobard and Sophie Névanen reviewed the cases of 864 
individuals who had been charged with “offences against persons invested with public authority” 
(including insults, assaults, and obstructions of justice) in a Parisian suburb. Looking at data from 
1965 to 2005, the researchers classified the defendants according to the same categories utilized 
by the Criminal Investigation Department—a “European group,” a “North African group,” and a 
“Black” group. Examining the likelihood that police officers would become plaintiffs in the proceed-
ings and sue for moral damages, the researchers found that police officers exercised this option in 
51 percent of the cases involving the “North African” group and in 46 percent of the cases involv-
ing “Blacks, but only in 37 percent of the cases involving the “European” group. While presiding 
judges were found to be impervious to the physical appearance of the defendants, it appeared that 
police officers’ decisions were indeed affected by the “origin” of the defendants. Fabien Jobard and 
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Associations Noires, or CRAN) which sought information on the frequency of police identity checks 
of members of “visible minority” groups. Five percent of the visible minorities surveyed reported 
being stopped 11 times or more in the preceding three years, and 38 percent reported feeling that the 
identity checks to which they had been subjected were motivated by the color of their skin. However, 
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non-minority. Thus, the odds-ratio is: [Proportion of minorities stopped/Proportion of minorities 
in the Benchmark] x [Proportion of non-minorities stopped/Proportion of non-minorities in the 
benchmark]. 
39. The odds-ratio discussed in the body of this report deals with a comparison of the likelihood 
of Blacks and Arabs being stopped by the police versus the likelihood of Whites being stopped by 
the police. It is possible, however, to calculate a different type of odds-ratio—one that compares the 
likelihood of one ethnic group being stopped by the police against the likelihood of all other ethnic 
groups being stopped by the police. This odds-ratio can be best explained by the following statement: 
“If you are Black/Arab/Indo-Pakistani/Asian/White, you are x times more likely to be stopped by the 
police than if you were non-Black/non-Arab/non-Indo-Pakistani/non-Asian/non-White.” The same 
parameters apply: if the odds-ratio is 1.0, then the ethnic group under study is not being ethnically 
profiled. While odds-ratios between 1.0 and 1.5 are considered benign, those that fall between 1.5 
and 2.0 indicate that bias may exist, and call for a review of police stop practices. Ratios above 2.0 
indicate police are targeting of minorities for stops. 
 The odds-ratio for Blacks when compared to non-Blacks clearly indicates that they are dis-
proportionately targeted for police stops. At Châtelet-Station, they are stopped 56.9 percent of the 
time, even though they form only 27.5 percent of the population, which creates an odd-ratio of 3.48. 
In other words, at Châtelet-Station, Blacks are almost three and half times as likely to be stopped 
by police as non-Blacks. At GDN-Thalys, Blacks are only 7 percent of the available population, but 
they are stopped 23.5 percent of the time; they are four times as likely to be stopped as non-Blacks. 
The odds-ratios at GDN-Station, GDN-RER, and Châtelet-Innocents, while lower, are all larger than 
2.0, and therefore indicative of ethnic profiling. 
 Arabs also appear to be stopped at rates disproportionate to their presence in the population. 
While they are under-targeted at GDN-RER, they are subject to disproportionate stops at GDN-
Station, GDN-Thalys, and Châtelet-Station. At GDN-Thalys, where Arabs constitute 2.8 percent of 
the population but are stopped 10.1 percent of the time, they are almost four times more likely to 
be stopped as non-Arabs. At both GDN-Station and Châtelet Station, they are close to three times 
more likely as non-Arabs be stopped. The odd-ratio for Arabs at Châtelet-Innocents (1.79) falls into 
the range that probably, but not conclusively, indicates ethnic profiling. 
 Whites are under-stopped relative to their proportion of the available population at each of 
the five observation sites. For example, although Whites were 51.4 percent of the available popula-
tion at Châtelet-Station, they were only stopped 9.2 percent of the time. At GDN-Station, they were 
71.1 percent of the population, but they were only stopped 19.1 percent of the time.
40. Laurent Mucchielli, “L’évolution de la délinquance juvénile en France (1980–2000),” 53 
Sociétés Contemporaines (1) (2004): 101–134. 
41. The lower odds-ratio for Thalys is likely because when the male of a couple traveling together 
was stopped the female also stopped with him. While we are not positive this was the case, informal 
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 42. See http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mode_gothique. 
43. See http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mode_punk#V.C3.AAtements. 
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news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7923658.stm. 
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lows: GDN-Station 81.7 percent ; GDN-RER 85.0 percent; GDN-Thalys 89.4 percent; Châtelet-Station 
89.1 percent; and Châtelet–Innocents 90.9 percent. 
46. When they were stopped, Blacks were frisked 9.9 percent of the time and Arabs were frisked 
12.4 percent, whereas Whites were only frisked 3.1 percent of the time. Blacks were also more 
likely to be taken into custody. When they were stopped by police, Blacks were taken into custody 
19.8 percent of the time. Stops of Arabs only ended with police detention 13.4 of the time, whereas 
stops of Whites only ended with detention 6.9 percent of the time. In the category of ordinary stop
—the least intrusive level of the stop encounter—43.8 percent of White stops and 30.9 percent of 
Arab stops were classified as such, compared to only 23.6 percent of Black stops. 
47. French Constitution of October 4, 1958.
48. According to Directive 2000/43/EC, direct discrimination “shall be taken to occur where one 
person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situ-
ation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.” Indirect discrimination “shall be taken to occur where 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin 
at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion on prac-
tice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving the means of achieving 
that aim are appropriate and necessary.” European Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June 
29, 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin, Article 2(1). 
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49. European Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000, implementing the 
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53. Law No. 2001-1066 of 16 November 2001 relative to the fight against discrimination (Loi no° 
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to the fight against discrimination): 
Discrimination defined by article 225-1, committed against a natural or legal person, is punished 
by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 where it consists:
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order to bar the access to this place, the penalties are increased to five years’ imprisonment and to 
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Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Article 3.1 and Council Directive 2004/113/EC imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of 
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also the Law on the Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants but this addresses only discrimination 
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members of the civil service. Law on the Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants, (Loi n°83-634 du 
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n° 86-592 du 18 mars 1986 portant code de déontologie de la police nationale), available at 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/misill/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/deontologie/code-
deontologie.
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municipale), which has the same provisions as the National Police code of ethics, only the number-
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obligates police to carry out their missions with regard to respect for human rights, the French 
Constitution, and international standards; and Article 10, which mandates that all persons arrested 
by the police are not to be subject to any kind of violence or degrading treatment.
 59. In 2005, Amnesty International expressed its concern that individuals at the time could not 
submit a complaint directly to the CNDS and that the current requirement to submit a case through 
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Learning from Research and Practice (New York: Open Society Institute, 2005): http://www.racialpro-
filinganalysis.neu.edu/IRJ_docs/Report_NewChallenges21.pdf. 
99. All benchmarking was supposed to have concluded by November 2007. Maintaining the 
original schedule was made impossible by several factors including: the 2007 Rugby World Cup, 
which caused massive changes in the available population at the Gare du Nord locations and at 
Châtelet-Station; several labor strikes which affected Paris’ transportation system; and the Christmas 
period, which also changed the available population. 
100. Only 0.5 percent were classified as “Other” and only 0.02 percent were classified as 
“Unknown.”
101. These percentages are weighted ethnicity percentages. Benchmarking data were collected at 
either six (GDN-Station, GDN-RER, and Châtelet-Station), three (Châtelet-Innocents), or two (GDN-
Thalys) time periods. Stops were also observed at those same time periods. To make the benchmark 
and stop data comparable, the benchmarks were weighted to reflect the proportion of stops that 
occurred at each location during each time period. The weighting did not create large differences 
in the benchmark population, and was utilized to assure the most accurate results possible. 
102. Stops were not observed during every month in this interval. Few observations were sched-
uled in December 2007 and no stop observations took place in January 2008, due to factors such 
as the monitors’ academic schedules and labor contract delays. 
103. Monitors were instructed to unobtrusively keep police in sight and to follow them (at a dis-
tance) as they conducted their foot patrols in the area. If the police left the delineated observation 
area (the same one that was utilized during the benchmarking phase), the monitors broke off their 
observations and waited for the next police patrol.
104. During the course of the study, there was also an attempt to collect data on the level of police 
discretion involved in the stop—the “type of stop” variable—which was broken down into the follow-
ing categories: (1) ordinary stop; (2) turnstile jumping; (3) public disorder; (4) gathering or fight; (5) 
call for help or summons; (6) delivery into police custody; and (7) public intoxication. As the project 
designers were unable to define with sufficient precision what these different categories meant, and 
as observers could not be sure that what they were observing conformed to any of these categories 
and thus could not be consistent in their categorization of this variable, the data was deemed unus-
able. It is discussed in this report.
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French residents of immigrant origin, particularly those from North and 
sub-Saharan Africa, have long felt that they are singled out for police 
identity checks that are unfair, discriminatory, and unnecessary.
Proﬁling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris is the ﬁrst 
rigorous study to produce quantitative evidence conﬁrming that persons 
perceived to be ethnic minorities were disproportionately stopped by the 
police, particularly when wearing clothing associated with youth cultures. 
This form of ethnic proﬁling by the police in Paris violates both French and 
European antidiscrimination and human rights standards. There is little 
evidence that it ﬁghts crime or increases public security. Instead, proﬁling 
practices reinforce stereotypes about ethnic minorities, distract police 
from effective crime prevention and detection activities, and destroy trust 
and cooperation between police and minority communities. And they 
contribute to tensions that can lead to major conﬂicts that endanger the 
safety of both the public and police ofﬁcers. 
Proﬁling Minorities provides an opportunity for French ofﬁcials to recognize 
ethnic proﬁling as a problem and start taking steps to end it. By using 
the results of this initial research to pursue further studies and policy 
change, French authorities can work with civil society groups to ensure 
that policing practices live up to the French republican ideal of the equality 
of all citizens.
